Discussion:
Announce: OpenSSH 7.2 released
(too old to reply)
Damien Miller
2016-02-29 02:12:27 UTC
Permalink
OpenSSH 7.2 has just been released. It will be available from the
mirrors listed at http://www.openssh.com/ shortly.

OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and
includes sftp client and server support. OpenSSH also includes
transitional support for the legacy SSH 1.3 and 1.5 protocols
that may be enabled at compile-time.

Once again, we would like to thank the OpenSSH community for their
continued support of the project, especially those who contributed
code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the
project. More information on donations may be found at:
http://www.openssh.com/donations.html

Future deprecation notice
=========================

We plan on retiring more legacy cryptography in a near-future
release, specifically:

* Refusing all RSA keys smaller than 1024 bits (the current minimum
is 768 bits)

This list reflects our current intentions, but please check the final
release notes for future releases.

Potentially-incompatible changes
================================

This release disables a number of legacy cryptographic algorithms
by default in ssh:

* Several ciphers blowfish-cbc, cast128-cbc, all arcfour variants
and the rijndael-cbc aliases for AES.

* MD5-based and truncated HMAC algorithms.

These algorithms are already disabled by default in sshd.

Changes since OpenSSH 7.1p2
===========================

This is primarily a bugfix release.

Security
--------

* ssh(1), sshd(8): remove unfinished and unused roaming code (was
already forcibly disabled in OpenSSH 7.1p2).

* ssh(1): eliminate fallback from untrusted X11 forwarding to
trusted forwarding when the X server disables the SECURITY
extension.

* ssh(1), sshd(8): increase the minimum modulus size supported for
diffie-hellman-group-exchange to 2048 bits.

* sshd(8): pre-auth sandboxing is now enabled by default (previous
releases enabled it for new installations via sshd_config).

New Features
------------

* all: add support for RSA signatures using SHA-256/512 hash
algorithms based on draft-rsa-dsa-sha2-256-03.txt and
draft-ssh-ext-info-04.txt.

* ssh(1): Add an AddKeysToAgent client option which can be set to
'yes', 'no', 'ask', or 'confirm', and defaults to 'no'. When
enabled, a private key that is used during authentication will be
added to ssh-agent if it is running (with confirmation enabled if
set to 'confirm').

* sshd(8): add a new authorized_keys option "restrict" that includes
all current and future key restrictions (no-*-forwarding, etc.).
Also add permissive versions of the existing restrictions, e.g.
"no-pty" -> "pty". This simplifies the task of setting up
restricted keys and ensures they are maximally-restricted,
regardless of any permissions we might implement in the future.

* ssh(1): add ssh_config CertificateFile option to explicitly list
certificates. bz#2436

* ssh-keygen(1): allow ssh-keygen to change the key comment for all
supported formats.

* ssh-keygen(1): allow fingerprinting from standard input, e.g.
"ssh-keygen -lf -"

* ssh-keygen(1): allow fingerprinting multiple public keys in a
file, e.g. "ssh-keygen -lf ~/.ssh/authorized_keys" bz#1319

* sshd(8): support "none" as an argument for sshd_config
Foreground and ChrootDirectory. Useful inside Match blocks to
override a global default. bz#2486

* ssh-keygen(1): support multiple certificates (one per line) and
reading from standard input (using "-f -") for "ssh-keygen -L"

* ssh-keyscan(1): add "ssh-keyscan -c ..." flag to allow fetching
certificates instead of plain keys.

* ssh(1): better handle anchored FQDNs (e.g. 'cvs.openbsd.org.') in
hostname canonicalisation - treat them as already canonical and
remove the trailing '.' before matching ssh_config.

Bugfixes
--------

* sftp(1): existing destination directories should not terminate
recursive uploads (regression in openssh 6.8) bz#2528

* ssh(1), sshd(8): correctly send back SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED
replies to unexpected messages during key exchange. bz#2949

* ssh(1): refuse attempts to set ConnectionAttempts=0, which does
not make sense and would cause ssh to print an uninitialised stack
variable. bz#2500

* ssh(1): fix errors when attempting to connect to scoped IPv6
addresses with hostname canonicalisation enabled.

* sshd_config(5): list a couple more options usable in Match blocks.
bz#2489

* sshd(8): fix "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes +..." inside a Match block.

* ssh(1): expand tilde characters in filenames passed to -i options
before checking whether or not the identity file exists. Avoids
confusion for cases where shell doesn't expand (e.g. "-i ~/file"
vs. "-i~/file"). bz#2481

* ssh(1): do not prepend "exec" to the shell command run by "Match
exec" in a config file, which could cause some commands to fail
in certain environments. bz#2471

* ssh-keyscan(1): fix output for multiple hosts/addrs on one line
when host hashing or a non standard port is in use bz#2479

* sshd(8): skip "Could not chdir to home directory" message when
ChrootDirectory is active. bz#2485

* ssh(1): include PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes in ssh -G config dump.

* sshd(8): avoid changing TunnelForwarding device flags if they are
already what is needed; makes it possible to use tun/tap
networking as non-root user if device permissions and interface
flags are pre-established

* ssh(1), sshd(8): RekeyLimits could be exceeded by one packet.
bz#2521

* ssh(1): fix multiplexing master failure to notice client exit.

* ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): avoid fatal() for PKCS11 tokens that present
empty key IDs. bz#1773

* sshd(8): avoid printf of NULL argument. bz#2535

* ssh(1), sshd(8): allow RekeyLimits larger than 4GB. bz#2521

* ssh-keygen(1): sshd(8): fix several bugs in (unused) KRL signature
support.

* ssh(1), sshd(8): fix connections with peers that use the key
exchange guess feature of the protocol. bz#2515

* sshd(8): include remote port number in log messages. bz#2503

* ssh(1): don't try to load SSHv1 private key when compiled without
SSHv1 support. bz#2505

* ssh-agent(1), ssh(1): fix incorrect error messages during key
loading and signing errors. bz#2507

* ssh-keygen(1): don't leave empty temporary files when performing
known_hosts file edits when known_hosts doesn't exist.

* sshd(8): correct packet format for tcpip-forward replies for
requests that don't allocate a port bz#2509

* ssh(1), sshd(8): fix possible hang on closed output. bz#2469

* ssh(1): expand %i in ControlPath to UID. bz#2449

* ssh(1), sshd(8): fix return type of openssh_RSA_verify. bz#2460

* ssh(1), sshd(8): fix some option parsing memory leaks. bz#2182

* ssh(1): add a some debug output before DNS resolution; it's a
place where ssh could previously silently stall in cases of
unresponsive DNS servers. bz#2433

* ssh(1): remove spurious newline in visual hostkey. bz#2686

* ssh(1): fix printing (ssh -G ...) of HostKeyAlgorithms=+...

* ssh(1): fix expansion of HostkeyAlgorithms=+...

Documentation
-------------

* ssh_config(5), sshd_config(5): update default algorithm lists to
match current reality. bz#2527

* ssh(1): mention -Q key-plain and -Q key-cert query options.
bz#2455

* sshd_config(8): more clearly describe what AuthorizedKeysFile=none
does.

* ssh_config(5): better document ExitOnForwardFailure. bz#2444

* sshd(5): mention internal DH-GEX fallback groups in manual.
bz#2302

* sshd_config(5): better description for MaxSessions option.
bz#2531

Portability
-----------

* ssh(1), sftp-server(8), ssh-agent(1), sshd(8): Support Illumos/
Solaris fine-grained privileges. Including a pre-auth privsep
sandbox and several pledge() emulations. bz#2511

* Renovate redhat/openssh.spec, removing deprecated options and
syntax.

* configure: allow --without-ssl-engine with --without-openssl

* sshd(8): fix multiple authentication using S/Key. bz#2502

* sshd(8): read back from libcrypto RAND_* before dropping
privileges. Avoids sandboxing violations with BoringSSL.

* Fix name collision with system-provided glob(3) functions.
bz#2463

* Adapt Makefile to use ssh-keygen -A when generating host keys.
bz#2459

* configure: correct default value for --with-ssh1 bz#2457

* configure: better detection of _res symbol bz#2259

* support getrandom() syscall on Linux

Checksums:
==========

- SHA1 (openssh-7.2.tar.gz) = 9567d00fffe655010c087aeb80c830cecbbecca6
- SHA256 (openssh-7.2.tar.gz) = 99GsHA8NwSGuEJhMc7hAOQ510y1xfGx27uJqyw73sCI=

- SHA1 (openssh-7.2p1.tar.gz) = d30a6fd472199ab5838a7668c0c5fd885fb8d371
- SHA256 (openssh-7.2p1.tar.gz) = lzzDey81l+TPWZsJ5gTnnA/l2bb1laJOke0GYoYLSsM=

Please note that the SHA256 signatures are base64 encoded and not
hexadecimal (which is the default for most checksum tools). The PGP
key used to sign the releases is available as RELEASE_KEY.asc from
the mirror sites.

Reporting Bugs:
===============

- Please read http://www.openssh.com/report.html
Security bugs should be reported directly to ***@openssh.com

OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de
Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre,
Tim Rice and Ben Lindstrom.
The Doctor
2016-02-29 04:20:55 UTC
Permalink
Post by Damien Miller
OpenSSH 7.2 has just been released. It will be available from the
mirrors listed at http://www.openssh.com/ shortly.
OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and
includes sftp client and server support. OpenSSH also includes
transitional support for the legacy SSH 1.3 and 1.5 protocols
that may be enabled at compile-time.
Once again, we would like to thank the OpenSSH community for their
continued support of the project, especially those who contributed
code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the
http://www.openssh.com/donations.html
Future deprecation notice
=========================
We plan on retiring more legacy cryptography in a near-future
* Refusing all RSA keys smaller than 1024 bits (the current minimum
is 768 bits)
This list reflects our current intentions, but please check the final
release notes for future releases.
Potentially-incompatible changes
================================
This release disables a number of legacy cryptographic algorithms
* Several ciphers blowfish-cbc, cast128-cbc, all arcfour variants
and the rijndael-cbc aliases for AES.
* MD5-based and truncated HMAC algorithms.
These algorithms are already disabled by default in sshd.
All right can we get this openssl 1.1 ready?

Looks like not too much needs to be done

in cipher.h

line 69 needs to be changed to

EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp;

In sshkey.c

replace pk->type to EVP_PKEY_type


Just cipher.c

we get

/usr/bin/gcc -g -O2 -Wall -Wall -Wpointer-arith -Wuninitialized -Wsign-compare -Wformat-security -fno-strict-aliasing -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 -ftrapv -fno-builtin-memset -I. -I. -I/usr/contrib//include -DSSHDIR=\"/etc\" -D_PATH_SSH_PROGRAM=\"/usr/contrib/bin/ssh\" -D_PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT=\"/usr/contrib/libexec/ssh-askpass\" -D_PATH_SFTP_SERVER=\"/usr/contrib/libexec/sftp-server\" -D_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN=\"/usr/contrib/libexec/ssh-keysign\" -D_PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=\"/usr/contrib/libexec/ssh-pkcs11-helper\" -D_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR=\"/var/run\" -D_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR=\"/var/empty\" -DHAVE_CONFIG_H -c cipher.c -o cipher.o
cipher.c: In function `cipher_init':
cipher.c:329: warning: passing arg 1 of `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset' from incompatible pointer type
cipher.c:331: warning: passing arg 1 of `EVP_CipherInit' from incompatible pointer type
cipher.c:337: warning: passing arg 1 of `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl' from incompatible pointer type
cipher.c:341: warning: passing arg 1 of `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length' from incompatible pointer type
cipher.c:343: warning: passing arg 1 of `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length' from incompatible pointer type
cipher.c:348: warning: passing arg 1 of `EVP_CipherInit' from incompatible pointer type
cipher.c:360: warning: passing arg 1 of `EVP_Cipher' from incompatible pointer type
cipher.c:367: warning: passing arg 1 of `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset' from incompatible pointer type
cipher.c: In function `cipher_crypt':
cipher.c:414: warning: passing arg 1 of `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl' from incompatible pointer type
cipher.c:419: warning: passing arg 1 of `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl' from incompatible pointer type
cipher.c:424: warning: passing arg 1 of `EVP_Cipher' from incompatible pointer type
cipher.c:431: warning: passing arg 1 of `EVP_Cipher' from incompatible pointer type
cipher.c:435: warning: passing arg 1 of `EVP_Cipher' from incompatible pointer type
cipher.c:440: warning: passing arg 1 of `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl' from incompatible pointer type
cipher.c: In function `cipher_cleanup':
cipher.c:471: warning: passing arg 1 of `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset' from incompatible pointer type
cipher.c: In function `cipher_get_keyiv_len':
cipher.c:518: warning: passing arg 1 of `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length' from incompatible pointer type
cipher.c: In function `cipher_get_keyiv':
cipher.c:550: warning: passing arg 1 of `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length' from incompatible pointer type
cipher.c:564: warning: passing arg 1 of `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl' from incompatible pointer type
cipher.c:567: request for member `iv' in something not a structure or union
cipher.c: In function `cipher_set_keyiv':
cipher.c:598: warning: passing arg 1 of `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length' from incompatible pointer type
cipher.c:604: warning: passing arg 1 of `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl' from incompatible pointer type
cipher.c:607: request for member `iv' in something not a structure or union
cipher.c: In function `cipher_get_keycontext':
cipher.c:633: request for member `cipher' in something not a structure or union
cipher.c:636: request for member `cipher_data' in something not a structure or union
cipher.c: In function `cipher_set_keycontext':
cipher.c:652: request for member `cipher' in something not a structure or union
cipher.c:653: request for member `cipher_data' in something not a structure or union
*** Error code 1

Stop.

Looks like change in evp.h are the source of these errors.
--
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Colin Watson
2016-02-29 11:03:52 UTC
Permalink
Post by Damien Miller
OpenSSH 7.2 has just been released. It will be available from the
mirrors listed at http://www.openssh.com/ shortly.
Thanks!

I notice that there's no V_7_2_P1 tag in git; I normally use the tag as
part of my packaging preparations. Please could a tag be pushed?
--
Colin Watson [***@debian.org]
Damien Miller
2016-03-01 02:52:15 UTC
Permalink
Post by Colin Watson
Post by Damien Miller
OpenSSH 7.2 has just been released. It will be available from the
mirrors listed at http://www.openssh.com/ shortly.
Thanks!
I notice that there's no V_7_2_P1 tag in git; I normally use the tag as
part of my packaging preparations. Please could a tag be pushed?
It's there now :)

-d
Corinna Vinschen
2016-03-02 20:00:12 UTC
Permalink
Post by Damien Miller
OpenSSH 7.2 has just been released. It will be available from the
mirrors listed at http://www.openssh.com/ shortly.
OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and
includes sftp client and server support. OpenSSH also includes
transitional support for the legacy SSH 1.3 and 1.5 protocols
that may be enabled at compile-time.
Once again, we would like to thank the OpenSSH community for their
continued support of the project, especially those who contributed
code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the
http://www.openssh.com/donations.html
There's a backward incompatible change in this release which is not
mentioned in the release notes. The slogin symlink as well as the
slogin.1 man page are not created anymore by the Makefile.

This change potentially breaks lots and lots of aliases, shell scripts,
and GUI keyboard shortcuts.


Corinna
--
Corinna Vinschen
Cygwin Maintainer
Red Hat
Andreas M. Kirchwitz
2016-03-04 13:41:37 UTC
Permalink
Post by Corinna Vinschen
There's a backward incompatible change in this release which is not
mentioned in the release notes. The slogin symlink as well as the
slogin.1 man page are not created anymore by the Makefile.
This change potentially breaks lots and lots of aliases, shell scripts,
and GUI keyboard shortcuts.
This may also be a serious security issue!

On most systems I know of the brandnew versions of OpenSSH are
installed in parallel to the SSH that ships with the operating
system. So users put (for example) /usr/local/bin in front of
/usr/bin to get the new OpenSSH binaries instead of the old
ones from the system. The shell automatically uses the new
binaries because they come first in the shell command path.

Now, when users run "slogin" they will no longer start the one
from the new OpenSSH but instead the shell finds the old one
from the operating system and starts that one. Although the old
SSH from the operating system might be secure because it gets
patches from the vendor, but usually it's an old version and
lacks a lot of new features (functionaly + security). So users
running "slogin" will not get the best protection possible.

For people who used rlogin/rsh/rcp back in the old days, it's
quite common to use slogin/ssh/scp in the same way (and the
developers supported that behaviour by linking slogin to ssh).

Now silently removing that historic link is a big issue.
Yes, sure, it's mentioned in the "ChangeLog", but honestly,
that should to be included in the main release notes.
(IMHO, there should be a dummy script for "slogin" that
warns users that they no longer get what they expect;
it's better to break things instead of silently compromising
security.)

Greetings, Andreas
Corinna Vinschen
2016-03-04 15:31:39 UTC
Permalink
Post by Andreas M. Kirchwitz
Post by Corinna Vinschen
There's a backward incompatible change in this release which is not
mentioned in the release notes. The slogin symlink as well as the
slogin.1 man page are not created anymore by the Makefile.
This change potentially breaks lots and lots of aliases, shell scripts,
and GUI keyboard shortcuts.
This may also be a serious security issue!
[...]
(IMHO, there should be a dummy script for "slogin" that
warns users that they no longer get what they expect;
it's better to break things instead of silently compromising
security.)
Please, no. Removing the script so the downstream distros can
provide it by themselves is ok, but providing a broken script
is worse, IMHO.


Corinna
--
Corinna Vinschen
Cygwin Maintainer
Red Hat
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